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Abstract: Background and historical information are provided 
for the electric power industry from its beginnings to the 
present. Major legislation affecting the industry is also 
explained. The concept of deregulation is defined. California is 
taken as a case study of implemented deregulation, and its 
problems are outlined. Steps taken to contain the widespread 
problems are examined, and other possible solutions to 
California' s problems are offered. 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this paper is to gain an understanding of the 
historical structure of the United States ' electric utility system 
and the changes to this structure currently taking place by 
"deregulating" the industry. Throughout the paper, the state of 
California is used as a case study of the procedures through 
which deregulation is to be accomplished. The degree of 
success of California in deregulating its power system is also 
examined along with suggestions for improvement. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Electric Utility Beginnings 
The modern electric utility industry began in the 1880s with 
the need for efficient power delivery for nighttime street-
lighting systems. The first major system, which opened on 
September 4, 1882 in New York City, was Thomas Edison ' s 
Pearl Street electricity generating system. The system initially 
supplied 59 customers with electric power, but with the 
demand for power for electric motors came the need for a 
utility that would be operational 24 hours a day. By the late 
1880s, small central stations, located near their end users, 
were built in many U.S. cities. 
Up to this time, stations were direct current (dc) stations and 
were inefficient in transmitting electricity over long distances. 
This changed in 1896 with the development of Niagara Falls 
by George Westinghouse. This station transmitted electrical 
power over 20 miles to Buffalo, New York using an 
alternating current (ac) structure. AC transmission is much 
more effici ent than DC transmission, especially over long 
distances. This results because the power losses in a 
transmiss ion line occur as current squared times line 
resistance. Thus, higher operating voltages for the same 
power output result in lower currents and lower losses. 
Because there is no single device that behaves as a DC 
transformer (these DC-DC converters came along much later 
with the advent of power electronics and still are not as 
efficient), AC transmission was chosen as he means of 
delivering power. The Niagara Falls plant was the first to 
prove that generating stations could be placed some distance 
from end-users and still be feasible. 
By the beginning of the 20th century, approximately 40 
percent of the electric power generated in the U.S. was 
produced by vertically-oriented utilities-utilities which are 
responsible for generating, transmitting, and distributing 
power. Many businesses still produced their own electricity 
for in-house use. As utilities began to install larger and more 
efficient generators and transmission networks, industrial 
users began to shift their generating needs to those utilities. 
Because electrical utilities were natural monopolies, 
regulation was a necessity. Many states began their own 
public service commissions to deal with the regulation of 
these large utilities. Rate-based regulation became the norm. 
Electric utility holding companies, which were companies that 
owned stock in several utilities, began developing in the early 
1900s. [n the 1920s, 94 percent of the electric utility industry 
was controlled by holding companies. By the late 1920s, the 
16 largest holding companies controlled 75 percent of the 
nation ' s generating capacity, and three of these controlled 
over half. Because these holding companies owned large 
blocks of utilities spanning several states, state regulatory 
boards could not control them. As a result, unregulated 
holding companies increased prices to increase their own 
profits. When several holding companies collapsed, the 
federal government had to step in to insure the continued 
operation of the industry. 
Public Utility Holding Company Act 
The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) 
was aimed at breaking up and regulating the large holding 
companies that controlled much of the nation ' s electric utility 
system. Under PUHCA, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was given the power to break up the large 
holding companies. The SEC required the holding companies 
to divest themselves of their assets until each company served 
a particular geographical area. Holding companies were also 
required to register with the SEC, and were permitted by law 
only to engage in those activities deemed appropriate for a 
single, integrated utility . Under PUHCA, the SEC was 
authorized to supervise these holding companies. The SEC 
also decided, on a case-by-case basis, whether each registered 
utility would need to be regulated or could be exempted from 
some requirements of PUHCA. 
At first, holding companies resisted the Act. Some even 
challenged its constitutionality. All of this ended when the 
Supreme Court upheld PUHCA's legal status. By 1950, the 
utility reorganizations were virtually complete. 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
PUHCA and its policies remained virtually unchanged from 
its inception in 1935 through the late 1960s. The electric 
power industry continued to meet increased demand with 
increased generation and transmission capacity. In October 
1973, Nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) imposed a ban on oil exports to the United 
States. The ban on oil was brought about for several reasons, 
the most major of which was the 1973 war between Israel and 
Egypt. OPEC threatened to ban petroleum exports to any 
countries that did not support the Arab position during the 
war. When U.S. President Richard Nixon proposed a $2.2 
billion military aid package to Israel, OPEC banned all oil 
exports to the United States. Although the ban was lifted in 
1974, the months of minimal petroleum production piqued 
public interest of energy issues, resulted in higher energy 
prices, and contributed to inflation. 
The 1973-1974 period prompted Congress to propose and 
adopt the National Energy Act in 1978. This plan was 
comprised of five major parts: The Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURP A), the Energy Tax Act, the National 
energy Conservation Policy Act, the Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Act, and the Natural Gas Policy Act. The 
National Energy Act was enacted mainly to reduce the United 
States ' dependence on foreign oil and the impact of energy 
shortages on price. 
PURPA requires utilities to allow any qualifying facility (QF) 
to connect to the utility ' s power grid. Utilities are also 
required to buy power from these QFs at the avoided cost of 
not producing the power themselves . PURP A created a 
market in which QFs would be guaranteed a purchaser of their 
power. To ease the cost of interconnection to power grids, 
Congress exempted most QFs from regulation by the SEC 
under PUHCA and from state regulation. 
For a non-utility to be classified as a QF, it had to meet one of 
two basic criteria: cogeneration or renewable resource. 
Cogenerators are generators that produce two distinct types of 
power either simultaneously or sequentially using the same 
fuel source. One example of this is a petroleum processing 
plant, which uses natural gas to produce electricity; the waste 
heat from combustion is used to create hot water and steam 
used in the plant for thermal processes. For a generator to be 
classified as a renewable, it must produce electricity from a 
resource that is renewable or virtually inexhaustible. 
Renewable energy sources include solar panels, wind 
turbines, and hydroelectric plants. 
By requiring utilities to purchase power from any QF and 
allow it to connect to the power grid, PURPA began the shift 
away from a monopolistic electric utility structure to one of 
some competition. This shift would continue as new 
legislation was enacted. 
Energy Policy Act 
Even before the passage of PURP A, many groups had 
attempted to change the policies set forth in PUHCA. These 
changes finally began with the passage of PURPA by 
allowing non-utilities to enter the electricity generation 
market. With the passage of the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) 
of 1992 by President George Bush, the electric utility industry 
could shift from a monopolistic structure to one of 
competition. 
EPACT created a new class of electrical generators called 
Exempt Wholesale Generators (EWGs). Like QFs, EWGs are 
exempt from PUHCA constraints of SEC regulation. Unlike 
QFs, EWGs did not have to meet the cogenerator or 
renewable classification, and utilities do not have to purchase 
power from them. Thus, EWGs introduced a truly competitive 
element to the electric utility industry. 
Besides allowing EWGs to enter the wholesale power supply 
market, EPACT also changed the transmission grid access 
available to non-utilities. These changes have led to open-
access electric power transmission grid for wholesale 
transactions; in other words, any producer may connect to the 
grid and produce power, although no one is required to buy it. 
Non-utilities have to pay a fee to the grid owners for this 
access, but this fee is set at a "just and reasonable" rate by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
DEREGULATION 
What it is & How it Works 
Deregulation refers to the process by which the electric utility 
system changes from a regulated, monopolistic environment 
to a competitive environment. Historically, most utilities are 
vertically-oriented. That is, the utilities generate, transmit, and 
distribute electrical power to the end-users. In a deregulated 
market, a single utility still owns and operates both the 
transmission system and the distribution system; this would 
still be the most efficient way of transmitting power, as it 
would require one single, consolidated electrical network. 
Generators, on the other hand, are owned and operated by 
private companies in a competitive environment. Under this 
system, electrical consumers are allowed to choose from 
which generator they would like to buy. Thus, generation 
becomes a competitive market in the hopes that by fueling 
competition, prices for the consumer will ultimately decrease, 
or at least not increase as fast as with the regulated system. 
CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA 
California's Deregulation Decision 
Many factors came into play when California's legislature 
chose to move to a deregulated system. In April 1996, FERC 
issued Orders 888 and 889. Order 888 required all electric 
utilities operating within the U.S. to have a non-
discriminatory access tariff for those facilities wishing to 
connect to the utilities' transmission systems to produce power 
available to customers. Order 889 established the Open 
Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS), which 
forced utilities to make information regarding transmission 
access and prices available to the public. These orders also 
forced utilities to abandon any practice of favoring their own 
generation capabilities over those of non-utilities, thus paving 
the way for a competitive market in any state. After FERC 
issued Orders 888 and 889, California decided to deregulate 
its entire system. In 1996, California had the tenth highest 
electricity price rate of the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia. Long before its decision to deregulate, California 
has had rates approximately 50 percent higher than the rest of 
the country. 
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Figure I - Plot of the monthly average electricity cost per kilowatt-
hour versus time for both Califomia and the entire U.S. Peaks occur 
during the summer months. 
Because of the historically high electricity costs, California 
took steps to reduce these costs. On September 23 , 1996, 
Governor Pete Wilson signed into law Assembly Bill (AB) 
1890, which was responsible for transitioning California's 
electricity industry to a competitive market. This transition 
would take place over a four-year period beginning March 
31 , 1998. 
AB 1890 created many changes in California's system. Rates 
were frozen at the June 10, 1996 level, and residential and 
small commercial users were given a ten- percent rate 
reduction from those levels. These rates were to remain frozen 
until March 31 , 2002. An independent system operator (ISO) 
and the California Public Exchange (CaIPX) were created; 
both were independent of the utilities and th us could not be 
controlled by them. . 
The ISO was responsible for insuring fair and impartial access 
to the transmission grid for all generators whi le maintaining 
reliable operation. Although the transmission system would 
continue to be owned by the investor-owned utilities (TOUs) 
as before the change, the ISO would control the network. The 
ISO insured that no company could block the access of 
another, and it charged fees required to keep the system 
operational and reliable. 
The CaIPX, which was regulated by FERC, served as a public 
auction for the buying and se\ling of electricity. The three 
largest power-producing IOUs- Pacific Gas & Electric 
(PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE), and San Diego 
Gas & Electric (SDG&E}--were required by law to sell their 
power to the CaIPX. Any other generators, even those located 
out of state, had the option of selling their power to the CalPX 
if they wished to do so. The CalPX would accept bids to 
purchase a certain quantity of power at a given price. The 
CalPX then gets bids from generators until it has purchased 
the demanded power at the lowest possible price. This created 
a "spot market" in which electricity prices changed on an 
hourly basis. PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E were forced to buy 
their power from the CaIPX for four years after its inception 
to sell to utility customers . 
Problems with the California System 
California's deregulated system worked fairly well for about 
two years after its inception, with prices remaining stable and 
the utilities able to meet demand. During the summer of2000, 
however, electricity prices in California skyrocketed to reach 
an all-time high. Generation capacity shortages, both within 
California and outside of it, also contributed to rolling 
blackouts in Northern California. The problems with 
California's deregulated electric utility system can be grouped 
into three broad categories: very high volatility in wholesale 
electricity prices, intermittent power shortages (rolling 
blackouts), and severe financial problems of the three largest 
IOUs (PG&E, SCE, & SDG&E). 
High Wholesale Prices 
Wholesale electricity prices on the CalPX began increasing 
around June 2000, and continued to do so through the 
remainder of the year. Prices rose approximately 270 percent 
from the June-July period in 1999 to the same period in 2000. 
From December 1999 to December 2000, wholesale prices 
rose from 2.971¢ per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 37.699¢ per 
kWh, an increase of approximately 1000 percent. 
These high prices can be linked to several factors, one of 
which is the high price of natural gas, which began escalating 
in the summer of 2000 and reached an unprecedented high 
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Figure 2 - Plot of the monthly average cost per million cubic feet 
($!Mcf) of natural gas for both California and the U.S. 
Natural gas prices have a significant effect on the prices of 
power in California for two major reasons: generators burning 
natural gas accounted for 38% of California's total generation 
in 2000, and power generators using natural gas have to 
compete with residential and industrial users for the same 
fuel. Because of the huge spike in natural gas prices in 
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Figure 3 - Chart of the types of electrical generation in California in 
2000 with each type's percentage of the total. 
Natural gas prices rose for several reasons, the most 
prominent of which is the deregulation of the natural gas 
industry around this time. Because the majority of California's 
generation is fueled by natural gas, the electric system was 
effected. 
Also, increasing demand for the fuel played a part. Simply 
put, natural gas is an excellent residential heating fuel, as well 
as an efficient method of producing electrical power from gas 
turbines. When demand increased in industrial, residential, 
and utility sectors, prices rose. The increased demand also 
forced natural gas companies to lower their reserve stocks to 
an all-time low, effectively raising prices as well. 
Aside from the increased demand, an EI Pas natural gas 
pipeline explosion in August 2000 factored into the price 
increases. Even after repairs, the federal government shut 
down portions of the pipeline when investigators found 
internal corrosion at the breakage site and other areas. This 
pipeline supplies a significant portion of California's natural 
gas demand. 
The high wholesale prices in turn created high retail prices for 
customers of SDG&E. In July 1999, the rate freeze was 
eliminated for SDG&E, and the high prices beginning in the 
summer of2000 were passed on to retail customers. 
Intermittent Power Shortages 
Power shortages in California were another reason for the 
severe electricity problems the state faced. These occurred for 
several reasons. One reason is the lack of investment in new 
power plants. From 1990 to 1999, California's in-state 
generation capability decreased by two percent, whereas the 
demand for electricity rose 11 percent during the same period. 
In fact, no new generation had been built in California during 
that entire time. 
California also relies on a significant amount of out-of-state 
hydroelectric power, much of which is located in the 
Northwestern U.S. During the times of peak prices, 
hydroelectric power production was reduced in the Northwest 
due to low water levels . 
Out-of-state producers exacerbated these blackouts in other 
ways. During this period of high wholesale costs and fixed 
retail prices, out-of-state companies refused to sell needed 
power to the three main California 10Us because of their 
questionable financial status. Because California traditionally 
relies on imports (11 % in 2000), power was not available for 
customers. 
Financial Problems of the Three Largest IOUs 
The third broad reason for deregulation problems in 
California was the severe financial problems of PG&E, SCE, 
and SDG&E, the state's three-largest !OUs. As is mentioned 
previously, the three IOUs lost huge amounts of money 
because of the retail price fix. Because of increasing 
wholesale costs, the IOUs could not pass the prices increases 
onto customers. PG&E has had the worst financial trouble: on 
April 6, 2001, it filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. PG&E 
estimated its non-recoverable costs at $9 billion. In November 
2000, SCE estimated its non-recoverable costs at $2.6 billion. 
That number has since increased beyond $6 billion. Because 
SDG&E's price fix was eliminated, it did not incur as much 
debt; however, SDG&E estimated its own non-recoverable 
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Figure 4 - Plot of generation in California versus time. This plot is 
introduced specifically to show California' s historical reliance on 
imported power. 
What Should be Done 
There are several possible measures that California can take to 
save its failing electric system. These are discussed below. 
Add More Generation Capabilities 
T bl I S a e ummary 0 fP ower PI t C tr an ons uc IOn P ~ects ro 
Approved (MW) 
Under 
Year Operational Construction Total 
2001 1914 0 1914 
2002 185 3631.4 3816.4 
2003 0 9894 9894 
2004 0 1600 1600 
2005 0 0 0 
Total 2099 15125.4 17224.4 
Pending (MW) Total (MW) 






Figure 4 shows California's historical reliance on imported 
power. For California to be self-reliant, it must add much 
more generation capacity. Governor Gray Davis has approved 
some projects in light of the electricity shortages, but it will 
not be until mid-2003 before California can fully provide its 
own power. By the end of 2005, California should have 
enough generation resources to be able to supply itself with 
power even when some power plants are offline for both 
planned and unplanned maintenance. 
Aside from this, the power plants should be designed to use 
certain types of fuel: namely, those fuels that either have a 
regulated price, or those fuels that are not used by residences 
for heating or other uses (natural gas). By using these types of 
fuels, price projections are more easily made, and supply 
interruptions cannot cause intermittent price surges. 
Bail out the Indebted IOUs 
California's three largest IOUs have all suffered severe 
financial trouble as a result of the deregulation plan. Since 
these IOUs are responsible for producing and controlling the 
majority of California's power, the state should step in to give 
monetary aid to these companies. Aside from issuing bonds, 
California should allow these companies to charge higher 
rates when wholesale prices are low (as they are now). This 
would allow for some cost recovery, and the IOUs would 
eventually be creditworthy. 
California has allowed some of these activities since the 
problems first occurred. In December 2000, California 
allowed the three largest IOUs to purchase power from 
sources other than the CalPX if they chose to do so. CalPX 
was discontinued in January 2001, and PG&E, SCE, and 
SDG&E were given leave to raise rates to recover costs. More 
rate hikes were approved in March 2001. 
Return to the Price-Regulated System 
Electricity is critical for everyday operation, and as such, its 
prices and supply should remain stable. When done 
improperly, deregulation can cause instabilities (as is the case 
with California). 
The power companies should be able to purchase power long-
term. This helps to keep prices stable by allowing fixed rates 
for the duration of the contract. 
One reason for California's decision to deregulate was the 
state's historically higher electricity rates when compared to 
the national average. However, there are several reasons that 
California should have higher rates. One prominent reason is 
the strict environmental stance of the state; another is the high 
risk of earthquakes. Californians, by virtue of their chosen 
living location, should expect to pay higher rates to offset the 
costs investors must pay to build and maintain generation 
facilities in that state. 
California has attempted to achieve these goals with mild 
success. On March 21, 2002, the state passed laws completely 
suspending retail choice (the hallmark of a deregulated 
system) as of September 20, 2002 for all customers except 
those with preexisting contracts. As the law stands now, 
however, those customers with the contracts would not be 
fiscally responsible for the debts previously incurred by the 
state. 
California has also been instrumental in purchasing long-term 
power contracts to insure a stable supply. As of this point, the 
state has purchased approximately $45 billion in electrical 
contracts. Governor Gray Davis made these deals at the height 
of the state' s power crisis; since then, power prices at the 
wholesale level have fallen off significantly. The state's 
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), working with Governor 
Davis, is currently attempting to reduce the cost of these 
contracts by $21 billion, but that appears to have little chance 
of success. As it stands now, the state expects to lose eighty 
cents on every dollar spent on these contracts. 
CONCLUSION 
California is still in the mid-stages of its electrical problems. 
The state has pledged an exorbitant amount of money to 
recover in the face of financial disaster, but California still has 
many years before it can correct for its deregulation problems. 
Although California has had historically higher electricity 
prices when compared to the U.S. average, those prices were 
stable. As such, California residents and industries could plan 
for those power costs far into the future. Before the 
deregulation decision, the cost-of-living in California was 
approximately 40% higher than the national average; 
electricity costs are about 50% greater. Californians have 
chosen to implement strict environmental laws and refuse to 
build coal- or nuclear-powered plants, and because of this 
residents should expect to pay more for their power. 
In summation, California's utility industry was never broken 
before the deregulation decision. Because the electric system 
is so critical for everyday operation, it should never have been 
altered. 
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